14 August 1944

14 August 1944

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14 August 1944



War at Sea

German submarine U-618 sunk with all hands off St. Nazaire

Eastern Front

Soviet troops begin an offensive from the Vistula Pocket

August 14, 1944 in History

Winston Churchill History:
January 30, 1965 - State funeral of Winston Churchill
January 24, 1965 - Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Britain, 1940 - 1945, 1951 - 1955, dies at 90
April 9, 1963 - Winston Churchill becomes 1st honorary U.S. citizen
April 5, 1955 - Winston Churchill resigns as British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden succeeds him
October 9, 1953 - British premier Winston Churchill aproves Guyanese Constitution
May 11, 1953 - Winston Churchill criticizes John Foster Dulles domino theory
April 24, 1953 - Winston Churchill knighted by Queen Elizabeth II
February 26, 1952 - Prime Minister Winston Churchill announces Britain has its own atomic bomb
November 29, 1951 - Winston Churchill re-elected British premier
October 26, 1951 - Winston Churchill re-elected British Prime Minister
May 10, 1948 - Winston Churchill visits The Hague
May 13, 1946 - Winston Churchill welcomed in Rotterdam
March 5, 1946 - Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri
July 26, 1945 - Winston Churchill resigns as Britain's Prime Minister
May 23, 1945 - Winston Churchill resigns as British Prime Minister
January 3, 1945 - British Premier Winston Churchill visits France
October 19, 1944 - British premier Winston Churchill flies back to London from Moscow
October 9, 1944 - British Prime Minister Winston Churchill arrives in Russia for talks with Stalin
October 9, 1944 - British premier Winston Churchill arrives in Moscow
September 17, 1944 - British Premier Winston Churchill travels to U.S.
August 11, 1944 - British premier Winston Churchill arrives in Italy
July 21, 1944 - British premier Winston Churchill flies to France, meets Montgomery
May 12, 1943 - British premier Winston Churchill arrives in U.S.
February 16, 1943 - British premier Winston Churchill gets pneumonia
January 13, 1943 - British premier Winston Churchill arrives in Casablanca
August 23, 1942 - British Premier Winston Churchill flies back to London from Cairo
August 4, 1942 - British premier Winston Churchill arrives in Cairo
June 25, 1942 - British premier Winston Churchill travels from U.S. to London
December 30, 1941 - Winston Churchill addresses Canadian parliament
December 26, 1941 - Winston Churchill becomes 1st British Prime Minister to address a joint meeting of Congress, warning that Axis would "stop at nothing"
December 22, 1941 - Winston Churchill arrives in Washington for a wartime conference
December 14, 1941 - Premier Winston Churchill travels to U.S. on board HMS Duke of York
October 25, 1941 - Winston Churchill routes "Forces South" to SE Asia
August 9, 1941 - Winston Churchill reaches Newfoundland for 1st talk with FDR
August 4, 1941 - Winston Churchill departs on Prince of Wales to U.S.
July 19, 1941 - British Prime Minister Winston Churchill launched his "V for Victory" campaign
September 15, 1940 - Prime Minister Winston Churchill visits #11 Fighter Group
June 18, 1940 - Winston Churchill urges perseverance so that future generations would remember that "this was their finest hour"
June 11, 1940 - Premier Winston Churchill flies to Orleans
June 4, 1940 - Winston Churchill says "We shall fight on the seas and oceans"
May 31, 1940 - Premier Winston Churchill flies to Paris
May 22, 1940 - Premier Winston Churchill flies to Paris
May 16, 1940 - Premier Winston Churchill returns to London from Paris
May 15, 1940 - Premier Winston Churchill flies to Paris
May 10, 1940 - Winston Churchill succeeds Neville Chamberlain as British Prime Minister
May 7, 1940 - Winston Churchill becomes Prime Minister of Britain
October 30, 1939 - German U boat fails on attack of English battleship Nelson with Winston Churchill, Dudley Pound and Charles Forbes aboard
September 14, 1939 - Minister Winston Churchill visits Scapa Flow
September 21, 1938 - Winston Churchill condemns Hitler's annexation of Czechoslovakia
March 14, 1933 - Winston Churchill wants to boost air defense
February 12, 1921 - Winston Churchill becomes British, minister of Colonies
January 13, 1915 - Winston Churchill presents plan for assault on Dardanelles
September 12, 1908 - Winston Churchill marries Clementine Hozier
November 15, 1899 - Morning Post reporter Winston Churchill and wife captured in Natal
October 30, 1899 - British Morning Post reporter Winston Churchill reaches Capetown
October 14, 1899 - Morning Post reporter Winston Churchill departs to South Africa
November 30, 1874 - Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister, 1940 - 1945, 1951 - 1955, Nobel 1953

More Notable Events on August 14:
1980 Democratic Convention in New York City nominates Jimmy Carter
1979 Rainbow seen in Northern Wales for a 3 hours duration
1947 Pakistan gains independence from Britain
1935 Social Security Act becomes law
1925 Mount Rushmore 1st proposed


Fort Lawton, in the Magnolia Bluff neighborhood of Seattle, was an Army training base and staging area for combat in the Pacific. In 1944, a group of Italian prisoners of war were stationed at the fort to perform labor and maintenance duties. These particular Italian soldiers were carefully selected -- in general they had been drafted into the war and had been unenthusiastic soldiers, unlike other prisoners of war who were committed fascists and difficult to handle. The Army was highly concerned with treating prisoners of war humanely in order to conform to the Geneva convention and because any poor treatment would likely be paid for by American prisoners of war in Europe. But some local citizens and military men objected to the lenient, congenial treatment this selected group of POWs received in Seattle. After all, a year and a half before, they had been battling U.S. troops in Africa. These Italian prisoners enjoyed supervised visits to area homes, taverns, and to the movies.

Also stationed at Fort Lawton were several segregated Port Companies of the Transportation Corps, composed of African Americans trained to unload ships in combat areas. According to contemporary newspaper reports of the episode, these troops resented Fort Lawton's Italian POWs who visited local taverns, which excluded black enlisted men. Among the resentments were allegedly that local women lavished attention on the Italians. "[G]irls come out to service dances and make a big fuss over the Italians," a Seattle Times article dated August 18, 1944, reported. "They find 'em romantic. You know, speaking a foreign language and all that."

Also present at Fort Lawton were white Military Police (MP) and some 10,000 other soldiers.

On August 14, 1944, the black troops were notified that the next day they would be shipped overseas. That night there was a big party in their mess hall. Late in the evening, three Italians returning from town encountered three African Americans. All had been drinking. The groups clashed, supposedly leaving one black American unconscious. A particular MP, a private, came by and took the unconscious man away to the hospital. This MP claimed that one of the soldiers blew a whistle and trouble then started. Supposedly angry at the injury of one of their group, a number of black soldiers entered the Italian bunkhouse and orderly room and began severely beating and stabbing the Italians along with the four American translators present.

Italians ran out of bed, hid under furniture, and ran out to hide in nearby woods. The barracks and orderly room were wrecked. Thirty-two men were later hospitalized a dozen sustained severe injuries including three fractured skulls, penetrating knife wounds, and shattered bones (Hamann, p. 142). The following morning the same MP who had transported the supposedly unconscious black soldier to the hospital, along with another MP, discovered the body of Italian POW Guglielmo Olivotto at the foot of Magnolia Bluff, hanging on wires that were part of the obstacle course.

Questions and Odd Occurrences

  • The MP who transported the unconscious black soldier later testified concerning the trouble starting and the whistle blowing, but at the time he drove right past the guardhouse without stopping to report trouble. He drove past the nearby hospital with the injured black soldier, taking him instead to a hospital on the far side of Fort Lawton. Another witness reported that there was no whistle.
  • After the attack started, several panicked phone calls were made from the Italian quarters, but there was a remarkable lapse of 30 to 45 minutes before Military Police arrived on the scene.
  • At least one white man was seen among the rioters, hitting Italians with a baton (p. 96).
  • A black soldier, among those detained after the riot, wrote to a friend in Washington D.C., giving his version of events. The white MPs, he said, had been harassing the Italians for days at the PX, “and trying to get the colored troops involved.” In general, he said, it was the whites who resented the Italians, far more than the blacks (p. 113).
  • Either through remarkable incompetence or a cover-up, all evidence of the identity of particular black rioters was destroyed. The Italian barracks were repaired and repainted with dazzling speed -- within 24 hours. Not a single fingerprint was taken, though they were everywhere. None of the white MPs could recall exactly who the black rioting troops were, claiming “you can’t tell one from another.”
  • All the black troops of both companies, whether or not they were involved in the riot, were herded into a stockade but allowed to keep their weapons. When their weapons were finally confiscated they were not tagged or in any way treated as evidence. They were thrown in a heap (p. 140-141).
  • There were no signs of struggle on Olivotto’s body. (However, there were superficial abrasions on his legs.) An important fact is that Olivotto was extremely fearful of black people. He was last seen leaping in terror out of a window next to his bunk. A possibility is that he was driven away from the riot by someone he felt safe with, i.e., a white MP (p. 146-147). Most evidence at the scene of the hanging crime, including clear footprints and the rope, was destroyed. Dominic Moreo, in his Riot at Fort Lawton, 1944, points out that shoes, apparently belonging to Olivotto, were found in the nettles some distance away. This might suggest that he was dragged through the nettles, face down, probably by two people. But the evidence is too sketchy to draw a firm conclusion.
  • Whatever happened, the Army’s investigator, Brigadier General Cooke, was scandalized at the large amount of obvious lying under oath by many MPs and officers at Fort Lawton.

The death of an Italian prisoner of war became an important issue to American military and diplomatic officials. U.S. Forces were then battling German forces in France and Italy and any perception that the U.S. mistreated prisoners had important repercussions with world opinion and with the treatment of U.S. prisoners in German and Japanese hands. There was immediate and intense pressure to solve the crime apparently perpetrated by African Americans.

After a hasty review of the facts, 44 African American soldiers were charged with a variety of counts including riot and murder. Four of the defendants faced the death penalty.

The charges were prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Leon Jaworski, a Texas prosecutor in civilian life and later Watergate Special Prosecutor. The defense was handled by Major William Beeks, a Seattle maritime law specialist and later U.S. District Court Judge. Beeks was given two weeks to prepare a defense for 44 clients, including four accused of capital murder. In the end, two soldiers had charges dropped, 13 soldiers were acquitted, and 28 were convicted, two of manslaughter. It was the largest Army court martial during World War II.

After the war, the longer prison sentences were reduced by a clemency board, although some soldiers served as long as 25 years. Guglielmo Olivotto was buried at the cemetery at Fort Lawton in an area away from the American graves.

A Death Far from Home

Of Guglielmo Olivotto, Jack Hamann writes:

“Olivotto was a quiet man, well read and devoutly religious. He was lean, five feet ten inches and just 150 pounds. His eyes were dark his hair was black and thick, except for a bald spot on the crown of his head he wore a dark mustache. A thin scar slid down the right side of his scalp at hairline. He was never married and had no children. He didn’t drink or gamble. He had no interest in being a soldier” (p. 11).

Sixty-three Years Later

In late October 2007, the Army's Board of Corrections of Military Records, after a year of deliberation, ruled that the black soldiers court-martialed in the death of Olivotto were unfairly denied access to their attorneys and to investigative records and should have their convictions overturned. This ruling applied to four soldiers who petitioned military investigators (three of them, represented by their families, are no longer living).

The soldiers petitioned after the publication of Jack Hamann's book, with the aid of Congressman Jim McDermott, Democrat from Washington state, and Representative Duncan Hunter, Republican from California. The four soldiers who petitioned were Booker W. Townsell, of Milwaukee, Luther L. Larkin, of Searcy, Arkansas, William G. Jones, of Decatur, Illinois, and Samuel Snow (1923-2008), of Leesburg, Florida.

After serving a year in prison and being dishonorably discharged, Snow returned to his home in Leesburg, Florida, to raise two children and to work as a church janitor. He lived for decades with the dishonorable discharge and was denied benefits of the GI Bill and veterans' health care. Snow was convinced that the conviction was a racial injustice but nevertheless burned his Army paperwork in order to hide it from his children.

Restitution would include honorable discharges and back pay for the soldiers who petitioned.

Snow told a reporter, "I'm rejoicing today. I'm not mad at nobody. I'm just as satisfied as can be" (Martin).

Eventually the convictions of all 28 of the veterans were overturned. On July 26, 2008, a ceremony was held at Seattle's Discovery Park near the former Fort Lawton chapel. The United States Army, represented by Assistant Secretary of the Army Ronald James, gave the men a formal apology, and presented the families with honorable discharges (all but two of the veterans were no longer living). Their families also received the soldiers' lost back pay. Also present to honor the veterans were an Army band and color guard. Speakers included U.S. Representative Jim McDermott, Seattle Mayor Greg Nickels, and King County Executive Ron Sims.

Samuel Snow died of congestive heart failure at Virginia Mason hospital, on July 27, 2008, 13 hours after the apology and honorable discharge.

The Seattle Times, August 18, 1944

Grave of Guglielmo Olivotto, Italian prisoner of war killed August 14, 1944, 2001

Attachments for German Operation against Staszow (Baranow Bridgehead 10 – 14 Aug 1944.

Post by sboyd2kus » 15 Mar 2021, 00:33

Reading a variety of sources, I think I have a good handle on the Geman and Russian forces involved in the German counterattack against the Baranow Bridgehead in Poland on 10 – 14 August 1944.

The only gap I have is about any Higher HQ attachments to the attacking 3 and 16 Pz Divisions, aside from the two TigerB Abteilungen (s501 and s509).

The Armored Bears v2 (TAB) mentions initial attachment of three Road Construction Battalions to 3. Pz, which were all the Germans had screening this area of the front at the time. Russian Prisoner interrogation reveals one Pio-Btl in the Chimielnik area as 733 Construction Engineer Batallion. TAB mentions attachment of Pio-Btl 70 to the 3. Pz force attacking Rakow around the 12th of August.
>>Were any Pio Btl attached to the 16. Pz Div?

What about artillery support? TAB mentions Werfer-Regiment 18 support after the 14th, when it was attacking in the area of the 20. Pz Gren Div., but no mention of artillery support other than divisional artillery assets to 3. and 16. Pz during the 10 – 14 August timeframe. Russian combat reports report receiving 105mm fire, which would track w divisional Wespe or leFH 18/40 fire.
>>Were any Werfer or heavy Artillery assets assigned from III Pz K (Gruppe Breith), IV Pz Armee, or HG NordUkraine?

>>Any Flak units?

Thanks in Advance - you all are extremely helpful and knowledgeable!

Re: August 1944 Disaster Befalls an Army Group

Post by Matasso » 17 Mar 2008, 10:01

There is one point missing here. There was absolutely no treaty whatsoever linking Romania and Germany. Antonescu decided on his own that Romania had to continue helping Germany after the recapture of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Everybody in the country was expecting Romania to stop being part of the eastern front from the moment Odessa fell. Antonescu, based solely on military questions decided Romania had to continue the war alongside Germany.
This is a much debated issue on modern romanian history: Why did Antonescu continue the war alongside Germany beyond the summer of 1941 without any formal agreement? Every time an agreement was reached with the germans from 1942 on they broke it. See the weapon supplies supposed to be given to the Romanians by Germany in order to secure the accept from Antonescu to send troops east to Stalingrad. Did the germans respect it? NO! See again what happened in Crimea in April 1944. Germany deliberately sacrificed Romanian troops in Sebastopol. Would you trust such an ally? I wouldn't.

Also, romanian leaders knew that Germany had prepared the topping of the Romanian Royal government and to bring back Horia Sima and the Legion leaders to ensure a hard line government. What was the romanian government to do? Let it happen? Don't think so!!
Besides the move was supported by the traditional parties leaders that were expecting to be able to gain sympathy from the western allies with such a move. That was always their aim and negotiations were actively pursued in Cairo from 1943 to secure the arrival in the country of western forces immediately after the coup exactly in order to avoid, if possible, the overrunning of Romania by the soviets. That it didn't work is another thing and our hindsight is very easy to say that Romania didn't win much with its commitment. In the long run, the 40 years of communist control destroyed a country that was totally turned to the west from its very beginning, but leaders at that time didn't know of the Churchill/Stalin agreements and were still expecting that, by their good will they could secure western support. It also must be said that in no moment were they offered any other option from the USA and Great Britain than to accept soviet conditions and start fighting against Germany in order to even be accepted into an eventual discussion. Which they did and were later abandoned by the western allies without any remorse.

Re: August 1944 Disaster Befalls an Army Group

Post by Mimo » 17 Mar 2008, 11:10

Of course not, the idea is absurd. So, please spare me the sanctimonious and utterly false claims that it was Germany that initiated hostilities, when in fact it was a German Army Group, in the advanced stages of its destruction, that continued to shield Bucharest from the Soviets while their Romanian "Allies" plotted behind its back, to successfully betray that army and Germany!

Re: August 1944 Disaster Befalls an Army Group

Post by David C. Clarke » 18 Mar 2008, 00:06

This is anther perfect example of sophistry. On its face, the term "armistice" means a cessation of hostilities. In this specific case, it meant cutting off an army fighting a ferocious foe, denying it reinforcements, supplies and a line of retreat, thereby further ensuring its destruction. So fine, an "Armistice", probably the first one in history that cost so many lives.
We can wade through the endless smoke-screens of legalisms on this Thread, but the fact remains that Romania stabbed Sixth Army in the back and knowingly sacrificed it to the Soviet Union, then commenced operations against other German formations within the country.

The rewards were 15 years of Soviet occupation, a Communist regime until 1989 and a slice of Hungary.

Re: August 1944 Disaster Befalls an Army Group

Post by David C. Clarke » 18 Mar 2008, 06:03

Well, it may be the case, having engaged in one war with Finland, the Russians were simply more interested in getting Finland out of the war than in forcing the issue and risking that Finland might stay in the war, with an intact German Army on their lands. Might be that the Finns' example of fighting until exhausted had a cautionary effect on the Russians, who, in any case needed the manpower elsewhere and could accomplish their aims while turning a blind eye to the Finnish desire to disengage with as little bloodshed between former allies as possible.

Of course, is should be noted that Finnish "last-ditch" resistance was not found in the military history between Romania and Russia, except in the case of General Lascar and his 6th division aided by the remnants of 13th and 15th Divisions in 1942.

Re: August 1944 Disaster Befalls an Army Group

Post by dragos03 » 18 Mar 2008, 08:26

This is anther perfect example of sophistry. On its face, the term "armistice" means a cessation of hostilities. In this specific case, it meant cutting off an army fighting a ferocious foe, denying it reinforcements, supplies and a line of retreat, thereby further ensuring its destruction. So fine, an "Armistice", probably the first one in history that cost so many lives.
We can wade through the endless smoke-screens of legalisms on this Thread, but the fact remains that Romania stabbed Sixth Army in the back and knowingly sacrificed it to the Soviet Union, then commenced operations against other German formations within the country.

The rewards were 15 years of Soviet occupation, a Communist regime until 1989 and a slice of Hungary.

As many others have pointed before me, at the time of the Romanian armistice, the German 6th Army was encircled 100 km in depth. Yet, you continue to state that it was the armistice that denied it "reinforcements, supplies and a line of retreat, thereby further ensuring its destruction". No comment needed.

As others pointed as well, not a single German was harmed or stopped from retreating in any way until they attacked Bucharest. A large part of the German forces in Romania left peacefully. There were many German commanders that understood the circumstances and chose to avoid a conflict with Romanian units, which didn't help Germany's cause. For example, the German fleet in Constanta and the sizeable German forces in the area left the port without any incidents, after the Romanian and German admirals met and agreed that the Germans had to leave asap to avoid future conflicts and before the arrival of the Soviets. It was only after the attack on Bucharest (which included the deliberate bombing of the city's landmarks) that the German garrisons were attacked and their retreat routes blocked.

The German 6th Army and all the other units lost in Romania were destroyed because of the incompetent German leadership:
- Hitler, who stripped the Army group of most of its mobile units dooming it at the time of the inevitable Soviet offensive and later ordered the attack on Bucharest, without caring about the fate of its troops in Romania
- Friessner, whose incompetent leadership (or better said, lack of leadership) was one of the causes of the defeat
- Fretter-Pico, who not only didn't do anything to prevent his army from being encircled, but also fled cowardly to avoid its fate

As for comparisons with Hungary or Finland, the situations were totally different. Hungary stayed in the war till the end only formally, as decided by a puppet government installed by force by the Germans. In the final phase of the war, most of the Hungarian army had surrendered already, as further fighting was futile. Using your "logic", one could argue that Romania also fought on Axis' side till the end, since Horia Sima's puppet government and its handful of units were still fighting for Germany.

Finland was saved by only one thing: politics. The same politics that doomed countries like Poland or Czechoslovakia, even if they fought for the Allies since the start. Even more, these countries were rewarded with an even longer period of Soviet military occupation than Romania was.

One final comment about this paragraph: "Of course, is should be noted that Finnish "last-ditch" resistance was not found in the military history between Romania and Russia, except in the case of General Lascar and his 6th division aided by the remnants of 13th and 15th Divisions in 1942".

This is simply insulting for all Romanians on this forum. Do you know how many Romanians died on the Eastern front and how many Finns? Half of my family died there. What were the Finns doing while Romanians were assaulting Odessa, holding against overwhelming odds in the Nogai Steppe, fighting in Crimea and the Caucasus, trying to resist the Soviet onslaught at Stalingrad, counterattacking with remnants of units during Operation Winter Storm, repulsing attack after attack in the Kuban or holding the last defensive position at Sevastopol when all the Germans broke and fled to the evacuation beaches? The Finns were just holding a static front, refusing to advance further or to assist the Germans at Leningrad because they were afraid of the future consequences. Then, when finally a major Soviet attack hit them, they made peace.

(I'm not bashing the Finns here, they were certainly brave fighters and they knew their interests better than any other of the Axis Allies.)

16th Panzer Division Gliederung and KStN info Poland August 1944

Post by sboyd2kus » 13 Mar 2021, 02:40

Interested in any Gliederung level information for 16.Pz Div in August 1944 timeframe.
I have scoured what I can on FieldGrau, Lexicon, and various other sites and sources, but there are a lot of unanswered questions.
I know the basic frame was Pz Div 44 organization.

Was there any KG organization for operations 10 – 16 August?

Div Stab
What Flak did Division have for Div HQ – Sources suggest SdKfz 7/1 plt.

2.Pz Regt.
I have an accurate OB for the I. Btl (II. Btl detailed on training mission to Romania)
What Flak type in Regt Stab, I.Btl Stab?
Was there a scout platoon in HQ element?

64. and 79. Pz Gren Regts
To what degree did I.64.Pz Gren Regt have SPW and what types. Was just the 1.I.64 Pz Gren in SPW or was the entire I. Btl (I know the lack of SPW generally could affect the degree of mechanizations).
Did Pz Gren Regts Have SdKfz 10/4 Flak platoons in their Hy Companies?
Hy company weapons are of interest.
Photographic evidence suggests that at sometime the 64. PzGr had SdKfz 252/1 II launchers. Did they still have them in August 1944?

Pz Jg Abt 16 - Sources I consulted indicated that there were 2 StuG IV companies and one Pak 40 company. Correct?

Pz AA 16
I believe I have a credible 16.AA organization from descriptions in Scouts’s Out and Tip of the Spear. The Axis History OB says it had a Luchs platoon, but I cannot find anything to back up use of that very scarce vehicle by the 16th. SO and TOTS indicate it was probably five 231 and five 233.
Sources indicate the 3rd Company may have been lacking vehicles at this time. I assume this means missing 250 or 251 type vehicles. Was 3 co. motorized w Kubelwagen or Steyr type vehicles?

16 Pz Artillerie Regt, Pz Pio Btl 16 and H Flk Abt 274
Standard organization, as far as I can tell. I.16 Pz Art Regt equipped with Hummel, Wespe per KStN.

Re: 16th Panzer Division Gliederung and KStN info Poland August 1944

Post by Алексей » 13 Mar 2021, 20:41

Re: 16th Panzer Division Gliederung and KStN info Poland August 1944

Post by sboyd2kus » 13 Mar 2021, 22:06

Алексей - I cannot thank you enough!!
Exactly what I was looking for.
This is more detail that probably about 80% of the posted Gliederungen I have seen.

Are the Officer/Other ranks numbers next to the Pz Gren total Btl strengths? CORRECTION - it seems the main strength is %, not number of effectives.
If so - each Btl are weak company strength!! The 10. Kp Pz Pio has more soldiers than each of the 64 PzGr Regt I. or II. ! << EDIT: Not correct.

I know that in early August, the 2.Pz Stab, and II.2 KG with II> Stab, and Co 1,4, and 5,6,7 were sent to the Balkans on a training mission.

Were there any reinforcements received prior to the attack of the 16 Pz. at Szydlow on 10 - 13 August?

Re: 16th Panzer Division Gliederung and KStN info Poland August 1944

Post by sboyd2kus » 16 Mar 2021, 03:15

I had thought that those % figures on the Gliederung were somehow inflated - I mean, only 12x m. SPW in II.94 PzGren, but 91% percent strength?

Well that may be accurate:

Feldgau Topic - “Koltov Corridor” and defeat of the Group Army North Ukraine - Feldgrau.net (Kamen Nevenkin)
The German Replacement System was very flexible and the Wehrmacht, despite all difficulties, managed to maintain the personnel strength of its divisions till the very end of the war. There was always a constant flow of replacements (both recruits and convalescents) to the front. Moreover, during the quiet periods, as in our case, the strength of the frontline divisions was close to their theoretical establishment. Here are some examples dealing with HG N.Ukraine (as for 1.7.1944 [ed. - July 01, 1944]):

- 16.PzD:
Authorized strength: 14 205
Shortfall: 384
Replacements received during the previous two months: 1 461 (May) + 1 307 (June)

But the unit was heavily involved in fighting starting 14 July in the Horokhniv and Druzhkopi region at the start of the Lvov-Sandomir Offensive.

Re: 16th Panzer Division Gliederung and KStN info Poland August 1944

Post by sboyd2kus » 16 Mar 2021, 05:17

Per Martin Block,, Feldgrau topic: Failure of 16. PD, 17. PD, 1.PD and 8. PD at Brody, 1944

On 1.7.1944
Pz.Rgt. 2 had (figures reflect totals)
53 Pz. IV L/48
31 Pz. V Panther
III./Pz.Rgt. 2 (acting as Pz.Jg.Abt.) had
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
19 StuG III

On 1.8.1944
Pz.Rgt. 2 had (figures reflect totals)
28 Pz. IV L/48
20 Pz. V Panther
III./Pz.Rgt. 2 (acting as Pz.Jg.Abt.) had
1 Pz.Bef.Wg. III
30 StuG III

Replacements sent during Juli 1944: 8 Pz. V Panther, 17 StuG III

=> Total losses in July 1944
25 Pz. IV L/48
19 Pz. V Panther
6 StuG III
Divisional losses in personnel: 301 KIA, 1247 WIA, 245 MIA

Re: 16th Panzer Division Gliederung and KStN info Poland August 1944

Post by Richard Anderson » 16 Mar 2021, 06:53

I had thought that those % figures on the Gliederung were somehow inflated - I mean, only 12x m. SPW in II.94 PzGren, but 91% percent strength?

Well that may be accurate:

In Gliederungen the percentages refer to Iststärke and Fehl of personnel in the unit. Thus, in this case the Panzerjäger Abteilung was at 100% of strength, but II./Panzergrenadier Regiment 79. was at 84% of strength and had a Fehl - shortfall - of 16% of its personnel. For the weapons, the numbers are the Ist - the number on hand (not the number operational).

Note however that personnel Ist actually included personnel assigned to the unit, but not necessarily present for duty. Wounded and sick personnel in hospital, but expected to return within 8 weeks (although that time frame varied in different periods of the war) were counted in the Ist, as were personnel on leave or TDY with another unit.

Re: 16th Panzer Division Gliederung and KStN info Poland August 1944

Post by sboyd2kus » 17 Mar 2021, 04:32

Additional information from my research, and from:
Panzer-Regiment 2 - Lexikon der Wehrmacht (lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de) complete story of 2Pz Regt / 16/ Pz Div, especially the strange deployments during 1944. (http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli . /PR2-R.htm)

“… First, in the first days of May, the regiment moved to the "area south of Stanislau, from where parts with the regimental staff as part of the division participate in the defensive battles eastward Kolomea. Here, for the first time, the Division fought in close association with a Hungarian division - the 25th Hungarian Infantry Division (mot.) - which is known for its accurately-shooting artillery. At the end of May 1944, the Dobrotow area at the Pruth is moved on, where the actual reconstitution begins. Soon the first new tanks arrive, all other vehicles are overhauled by the workshop and repair elements. Under the direction of the department commanders, I. Abteilung, Captain Kuckein, for the II . In the meantime, Captain Hannibal von Lüttichau had arrived, is eagerly trained by the companies and games through the upcoming assignments in numerous planning and sandbox games. The III. Abteilung [Ed. StuG] leaves the regimental association these days and becomes an independent Abteilung of the division under the leadership of its commander, Captain Weiss. Once again, on July 3, 1944, the division was sent to an endangered front post, and the march runs from Dobrotov to Stanislau, Halisz. Rohatyn - eastward Slemberg past - Sokal to Wlodzimierz, about 50 kilometers north of Lviv. The front is held in this area by infantry divisions. First of all, there is still peace. In the meantime, other parts of the Russian front had begun the summer offensive, and as part of these battles, the front was also taken back to the west in the section of the division on July 13, 1944. The enemy continues to push hard, and in order to relieve the heavy-fighting Grenadier regiments, the [Panzer] regiment is used as a "fire brigade". Already, on the first day, in a counter-attack, the commander of the I. Abteilung, Captain Kuckein, falls. Tough battles are to be fought from all parts in the coming days and weeks. Only the places of Poryk, Zawidow and Rykowice are mentioned. Under constant pressure from the enemy, the front is taken further and further west, and finally, in order to avoid a cauldron, the regiment goes back over the bow via Kniaze, Tartakov at Sokal. The enemy is pushing west with strong armored forces the settling movements are further carried out. Under some rather loss-making battles, the tanks from Sokal via Rawa Ruska – Zolkyev - Yanov enter the area west of Lviv, which is already in enemy hands, but in the southeast of the city there are still German troops. From Grodec, the regiment joins the II. Abteilung Panzer-Artillery-Regiment 16 [Ed. – the self-propelled Abteilung of the Pz-Artillery Regiment] the Panzer-Reconnaissance-Abteilung 16 and the 3.Company of the Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 16 for a advance south of Lviv. But already at Dawidow, about 10 km southeast of Lviv, the Kampf Gruppe encounters stiff resistance. Heavy fighting develops here. The regiment suffers heavy losses at Dawidow, Zyrawka and Krotoszyn. The subsequent settling movement gives the tanks considerable difficulties because of the completely swamped section of the stream at the latter places, so that a part has to be blown up. In further alternating battles south of Przemysl and near Sambor, Galicia is further west and [the division] reached the area of Nowy-Sandez. In the Sambor area, the Tross [Ed. – logistical Trains] had been pushed south by the enemy and separated from the combat elements. In an adventurous journey, they enter Slovakia via Hungary, cross the Jablunka pass and return to their Abteilungen in the Nowy-Sandez [Nowy Sacz] and Krakow area. [Ed. – The supplied Gliederung is from about this date]
The II. Abteilung without the 8th company and from the I. Abteilung the 1st and 4th company were moved as personnel units at the beginning of August 1944 [Ed. - On 04 August 44, as specified later] to the area south of Krakow. It is said that these parts of the regiment are to be refreshed and even possibly moved to the Reich. But the development takes other paths and finally the II. Abteilung has left the regiment and does not return until the end of the war. Their fate will be reported in a later chapter.

The enemy had meanwhile crossed the Vistula and formed a larger bridgehead west of Baranov. This bridgehead is to be removed by an attack on 8 August 1944. The division moves to Michow and the regiment moves to Wodzislaw, about 80 km north of Krakow. The attack is carried out via Pinczow - Chmielnik - Szydlov and was to reach the Vistula via Stsazow. For this attack, the Division is subordinated to a King Tiger Abteilung under Major von Legat [Ed. – sPzAbt 501], who is no stranger the regiment. Despite numerous mine barriers, the attack is progressing well at first, but a strong pakriegel [Ed. - PaK or AT Belt?] is encountered east of Szydlow. The use of the King Tigers is a failure, as these are seriously technical defects. But the few vehicles that are at the enemy cause considerable confusion with the tanks of the regiment at the Russians. First, the front is held here despite numerous enemy attacks, later the Division is redeployed to another section at the bridgehead. In the course of these ventures, the tanks of the regiment arrive in the Kielce area in mid-October after several relocations and take up position in Orlowiny, about 20 km southeast of Kielce. At this time, the tanks were led by the I. Abteilung [Ed. – Abteilung Stab], as the regimental staff moved out to a special operation with the personnel unit of the II. Abteilung, of which it is still being reported. The regimental staff did not return from there until the end of September 1944.

The fate of the II. Abteilung from August 1944 to the end of the war in 1945.
The Second Division, without the 8th company, with subordinate 1st and 4th company, was pulled out of the regimental association on 4 August 1944 as a personnel unit, under Captain Hannibal of Lüttichau, and gathers in Neumarkt, a small, pretty town south of Krakow. Under the supervision of a set-up staff, which also has an armoured division of the 11th Panzer Division, the reorganization of the personnel and the repair of the few remaining wheeled vehicles begins. The expected tanks from the homeland are not yet assigned. “ [ emphasis, mine]

ANALYSIS - The remainder of this strange circuitous story is worth reading, but not relevant to the time period in consideration.
So it seems that from 01 Aug 44 to the attack on Szydlow on the 11th of August, the unit reorganized some, and somehow was brought up to the personnel numbers indicated on the Gliederung. There is no indication of additional equipment being added ( other than possibly a few short term repairs?). To the contrary it seems the Regiments Stab and the personnel of the II. Abteilung departed for a special mission and since there were plenty of tankers remaining, I. Abteiling merely picked up the II. Abteilung vehicles and used them in the attack.

Metaxas's Counterfeit Bonhoeffer

Review of Eric Metaxas, Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy: A Righteous Gentile Vs. the Third Reich (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2010)

by Richard Weikart, California State University, Stanislaus

Eric Metaxas's Bonhoeffer biography has won many accolades from evangelicals, not only because Metaxas is an excellent writer, but also because he serves up a Bonhoeffer suited to the evangelical taste. Many evangelicals admire Bonhoeffer and consider him a fellow evangelical. Metaxas's book confirms this image. In an interview with Christianity Today Metaxas even made the astonishing statement that Bonhoeffer was as orthodox theologically as the apostle Paul.

As orthodox as Paul? Metaxas does not seem to know that in his Christology lectures in 1933 Bonhoeffer claimed, "The biblical witness is uncertain with regard to the virgin birth." Bonhoeffer also rejected the notion of the verbal inspiration of scripture, and in a footnote to Cost of Discipleship he warned against viewing statements about Christ's resurrection as ontological statements (i.e., statements about something that happened in real space and time). Bonhoeffer also rejected the entire enterprise of apologetics, which he thought was misguided. [1]

How did Metaxas get it so wrong? Part of the problem, perhaps, is that Metaxas simply got in over his head. Bonhoeffer was a sophisticated thinker immersed in early twentieth-century German philosophy and theology. Even though I have a Ph.D. in modern European intellectual history and have read Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Barth, Bultmann, and many other philosophers and theologians who shaped Bonhoeffer's thought, I do not find Bonhoeffer's writings an easy read. For one thing, Bonhoeffer (like his mentor Barth) admitted that Kierkegaard was one of the most powerful influences on his theology, which means that Bonhoeffer was committed to an irrationalist, existentialist worldview that is quite different from the mindset of American evangelicals. Though most evangelicals probably do not know it, most Bonhoeffer scholars dismissively reject the idea that Bonhoeffer's theology is compatible with American evangelical theology.

I trust that Metaxas is my brother in Christ, but unfortunately he simply does not have sufficient grounding in history, theology, and philosophy to properly interpret Bonhoeffer. This is not just my opinion. Victoria Barnett, the editor of the English-language edition of Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, wrote a scathing review of Metaxas's biography. In her opinion, Metaxas "has a very shaky grasp of the political, theological, and ecumenical history of the period." She then calls Metaxas's portrayal of Bonhoeffer's theology "a terrible simplification and at times misrepresentation." [2] Clifford Green, another bona fide Bonhoeffer scholar who has edited part of Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works and has written extensively about Bonhoeffer, has also criticized Metaxas heavily, claiming that Metaxas's biography should be entitled, "Bonhoeffer Hijacked." [3]

Let's start with the historical problems. Metaxas read enough about Bonhoeffer's life to get many facts right about the events of Bonhoeffer's life. This is the strongest part of the biography. Even here, however, there are some major problems. For instance, Metaxas mistakenly claims, "From the beginning of his time until the end, Bonhoeffer maintained the daily discipline of scriptural meditation and prayer he had been practicing for more than a decade. . . . Once he got his Bible back he read it for hours each day." (p. 438) This portrait will certainly make Bonhoeffer popular among serious evangelicals, but unfortunately this image is false. In 1944 Bonhoeffer wrote to his friend Eberhard Bethge, "Once again I'm having weeks when I don't read the Bible much." Bonhoeffer had told Bethge the same thing twice before in 1941 and 1942. [4]

Metaxas also does not have a solid grasp on Bonhoeffer's historical context. It is hard to give much credence to someone writing about German history who thinks that Bonn is in Switzerland or that Hitler was democratically elected into office or that Germany was not yet a police state in August 1934. Metaxas also claims that the Barmen Declaration, which was the doctrinal statement of the Confessing Church, rejected anti-Semitism. In reality, the Barmen Declaration does not mention anti-Semitism at all, and many scholars have criticized it for this.

Metaxas also seems to have little understanding of German theology. His bibliography contains no works on German theology, except for works specifically about Bonhoeffer, and even many important works on Bonhoeffer's theology are missing from his reading list. Metaxas correctly acknowledges that Karl Barth was the most important influence on Bonhoeffer's theology. However, he never explains anything about Barth's theology, except that Barth opposed liberal theology. Metaxas does not seem to understand that Barth's rejection of liberal theology did not cause him to embrace biblical inerrancy.

Events dominate this biography, and Metaxas only devotes a few pages to discussing Bonhoeffer's writings. Indeed it is hard to tell how much he has even read of Bonhoeffer's corpus. For example, in 1932-33 Bonhoeffer taught theology at the University of Berlin two of his courses were published: Creation and Fall and Christ the Center. Though Metaxas lists both in his bibliography, he does not discuss them nor cite them. Both of these works contain ideas that would cause most evangelicals to cringe (or worse). Even Bonhoeffer's Ethics receive only cursory treatment, and Metaxas does not fathom Bonhoeffer's support for situation ethics therein.

Metaxas, then, has presented us with a sanitized Bonhoeffer fit for evangelical audiences. Evangelicals can continue to believe comfortingly that Bonhoeffer is one of them, and that his heroic stance against Hitler was the product of evangelical-style theology. This view is naive, but many wish it to be so. They might prefer Metaxas's counterfeit Bonhoeffer to the real, much more complex, German theologian who continued to believe in the validity of higher biblical criticism, who praised Rudolf Bultmann when he called for demythologizing the New Testament, and who in his prison writings called for us to live "as if there were no God." In 1944, toward the end of his life, Bonhoeffer admitted that he was a theologian who "still carries within himself the heritage of liberal theology." [5]

1. For an evangelical critique of Bonhoeffer's theology, see Richard Weikart, The Myth of Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Is His Theology Evangelical? (International Scholars Publications, 1997), or Richard Weikart, "Scripture and Myth in Dietrich Bonhoeffer," Fides et Historia 25 (1993): 12-25 also, I am currently writing another book that will probably be entitled, "Why Evangelicals Do Not Understand Bonhoeffer."

2. Victoria Barnett, review of Metaxas, Bonhoeffer, in Association of Contemporary Church Historians Newsletter 16, 3 (September 2010), at http://journal.ambrose.edu/ojs/index.php/acchquarterly/article/view/46/92, accessed September 2010.

3. Clifford Green, "Hijacking Bonhoeffer," Christian Century (Oct. 5, 2010), at www.christiancentury.org/reviews/2010-09/hijacking-bonhoeffer, accessed Jan. 13, 2011.

4. Bonhoeffer to Bethge, March 19, 1944, in Widerstand und Ergebung: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus der Haft (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1954), 163 (also in Letters and Papers from Prison, trans. Reginald Fuller et al. [NY: Macmillan, 1971], 234) Bonhoeffer to Bethge, January 31, 1941, and June 25, 1942, in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Eberhard Bethge, 5 vols. (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1958ff.), 5:397, 420. 5. Bonhoeffer to Bethge, 3 August 1944, in Widerstand und Ergebung, 257 (Letters and Papers from Prison, 378).

14 August 1944 - History

I t took only six weeks for France to capitulate to the German invaders. A stunning defeat - particularly since before the war the French army was considered the most powerful in Europe.

France's vaunted Maginot Line failed to hold back the Nazi onslaught and the German Blitzkrieg poured into France. (see Blizkrieg, 1940) Thousands of civilians fled before it. Traveling south in

A Frenchman weeps as German
troops march into Paris
June 14, 1940
cars, wagons, bicycles or simply on foot, the desperate refugees took with them what few possessions they could salvage. It wasn't long before the roads were impassable to the French troops who were headed north in an attempt to reach the battlefield.

Paris was abandoned and declared an Open City. The French government joined the fleeing throng and after moving to, and then quickly abandoning one location after another, finally ended up in the city of Vichy.

The ultimate humiliation came at the signing of the armistice on June 22. The French had maintained as a memorial the railroad car in which the armistice ending World War I had been signed twenty-two years earlier. It occupied a hallowed space within a small forest north of Paris. Hitler insisted that France's capitulation to his Nazi jauggernaught be formally acknowledged in the same railroad car at the same spot.

Under the terms of the armistice, France was divided into two sections: Occupied France under direct German control and Vichy France - a quasi-independent territory with Marshall Petain, an eighty-four-year-old hero of the First World War, as its head.

A reporter for the London Times published his observations on defeated France shortly after its collapse:

"A problem for all who think about it is how to explain the amazing mental attitude which seems to prevail today in France. Most Frenchmen seem to regard the total collapse of their country with a resignation that has the appearance of indifference. They are, indeed, dazed by the rapidity of the collapse, but register no violent reaction to so great and unexpected a shock. Soldiers in considerable numbers are being demobilized and returning home, and so, it is felt, the catastrophe cannot be too appalling. The German propaganda machine is working on this state of mind. The R.A.F. attacks upon the aerodromes in the occupied region are used as evidence that the British, who have already deserted their Ally, are now making direct onslaughts on the Frenchman's home.

Conditions in Vichy France

"Vichy, for a nation which has reached the nadir in its history, gives an excellent picture of a certain French state of mind. Naturally the place is crowded beyond capacity. It is full of well-to-do refugees from occupied France, as well as French officers, immaculately accoutered, and political aspirants. They crowd the cafes, hotels and boulevards. The refugees and officers are enjoying the calm and the mild pleasures to be had there.

The aspirants are busily fishing in the stirring political pool in the hope of finding an agreeable job. There is adequate food for those who can afford to buy it, always provided that you are not a butter lover or do not expect to find a wide selection of luxuries in the shops. Here is little evidence that France has suffered one of the greatest defeats in her history. Outside the boundaries of this temporary capital, food is not so plentiful, yet in a minor degree the same spirit of indifference exists. The men are returning fairly quickly to their homes and to the harvests which have been in many cases ruined by inattention. But it is hard to discover any serious attempt to meet the formidable problems which are threatening the Vichy Government."

Conditions in Occupied France

"The opinion is often expressed that occupied France is in a much better shape, in spite of all the devastation, than the unoccupied territory. The Germans for many reasons are trying to whip into shape that part of the country which has fallen into their sphere of influence. Their problem is especially serious.

The division of France
North of Paris there exists a desert. Towns like Abbeville, Amiens, Cambrai, Arras, and scores of others are very largely destroyed, though in most places the churches and the cathedrals seem to be intact. The villages are deserted, the farmsteads empty.

Crops are rotting on the ground. The first wave of the German Army consumed everything. It was, in fact, until a week or two ago a land of the dead, metaphorically and literally, since the corpses of men and animals still littered the ground. Now the people are slowly creeping back, only to find that there is little to eat and less to do. Everywhere the first pick of what is going falls to the army of occupation, the second to those who work for their German masters, the scanty crumbs that remain are left for those who fulfill neither of these conditions."

Treatment of British Prisoners

"One case of refined cruelty was witnessed at Malines, where a body of British prisoners were being marched east. They were in full uniform except for their tin hats. These had been replaced by a variegated assortment of every kind of headgear, male or female: bowler hats, toppers, caps, homburgs, women's bonnets, berets, plumed Ascot models. A pathetically ridiculous spectacle. Its only purpose could have been to make the weary men look clownish or to suggest to the French inhabitants that British troops had been looting the shops. Other tales of discrimination between British and French prisoners of war are common. Nevertheless, on the whole, the treatment of prisoners whose care is left to the second-line troops is not too bad."

This article was originally published in The Times of London on August 17, 1940, republished in The Times of London, Europe Under the Nazi Scourge (1941) Shirer, William L., The Collapse of the Third Republic: an inquiry into the fall of France in 1940 (1969).

14 August 1944 - History

Documents on Germany, 1944-1959 : background documents on Germany, 1944-1959, and a chronology of political developments affecting Berlin, 1945-1956

Protocol of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, August 1, 1945 [extracts], pp. 24-35 PDF (4.8 MB)

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1939 to 1944

One of several posters contained in the papers of the State Defense Council of Florida, which helped organize communities across the state to meet the needs of the war effort during World War II 1942.

The United States’ entry into the Second World War touched off a transformative period in Florida’s history. Over a quarter million Floridians, including men and women of all races, joined the fight against the Axis Powers. Of these brave individuals, over 3,500 would give their lives in defense of their country.  The state’s population increased by 46 percent in the 1940s, a change fueled by the arrival of former servicemen and their families who had visited Florida during the war and liked it so much they returned for good .

A fifth (51,467) of the Floridians who served in the military were African-Americans. Despite ongoing segregation throughout the state at this time, these individuals chose to serve their country, in part hoping that military service would help erase the inequities that separated them from their white counterparts. African-American community leaders promoted this strategy as a quest for a “double V” victory – victory over enemies abroad as well as segregation at home.

News of Japan’s surrender reached Florida just after 7:00 p.m. on August 14, 1945. Virtually the entire state erupted into a frenzy of celebration unlike anything in the history of Florida. Automobiles, horses, carts and vehicles of every description jammed the streets in informal parades, with drivers honking their horns and shouting. In Key West, 10 long horn blasts signaled the news to dwellers of the Florida Keys for miles around. At Port Everglades, all the ships in the harbor celebrated by sounding their mighty whistles at once in a deafening roar. The war was over.  The thrill of victory was tempered somewhat by the sobering reality of its cost. Over 418,000 American citizens – soldiers and civilians – lost their lives as a result of World War II. Many more received injuries that affected them for the remainder of their lives. Official reports from 1946 list a total of 3,540 Floridian casualties in the Army and Army Air Forces and 2,314 total Floridian casualties among Navy, Coast Guard and Marine personnel. Finding suitable ways to honor the sacrifices of these Floridians became a critical component of the recovery process for communities across the state. 

Camp Blanding, where Ben Shaw was at, located southwest of Jacksonville in Clay County, started out as a summer training facility for the Florida National Guard. During the war, however, it became the state’s fourth largest city, housing 55,000 military personnel. It included 125 miles of paved roads as well as a hospital with 2,051 beds. When the camp was first proposed in 1939, the cost for constructing it was estimated to be $700,000. With wartime expansions, the complex ultimately cost $60 million, as military authorities converted it into one of the largest training bases in the Southeast. 

Soldiers at Camp Blanding 1941

Aerial view of Camp Blanding 1942

Jiu Jitsu at the Naval Air Technical Training Center (NATTC) in Jacksonville, Florida 1940s

Meanwhile, a unique form of training was underway on Florida’s Gulf coast near Carrabelle. The Army and Navy had been looking for suitable sites for training personnel for amphibious invasions, and this stretch of coastline appeared to fit the bill. Once the site was selected, the federal government quickly bought up 10,000 acres and leased an additional 155,000 acres of land, forming a base with nearly twenty miles of Gulf coast frontage between St. George Island and Alligator Point, including Dog Island and the beaches near Carrabelle. The new installation was named for Gordon Johnston, an Alabama native who served in the Spanish-American War and World War I and received the Medal of Honor in 1910. Thousands of servicemen trained at Camp Gordon Johnston, many of whom were involved in the amphibious “D-Day” invasion of Normandy in 1944. 

Training for amphibious warfare at Camp Gordon Johnston 1943

Governor Caldwell on a visit to Camp Gordon Johnston on February 1, 1945 - Carrabelle

Post Falls Evergreen Cemetery 2013

Robert Eugene Brewer Jr., from Sedgwick county, Kansas, e nlisti ed at the age of 21 on 03/17/1944, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

1944 Robert Eugene Brewer right: CSWaters-Mixon

1944 Robert Eugene Brewer right: CSWaters-Mixon

 Robert E Brewer Jr: Army service number 37737145 was a private in the Selectees during World War II,. Skilled Mechanics and Repairmen, N.E.C Duration of War, Plus 6 Mos. Group Regiment Commands System, Parachute Inf, European Theatre France.

Darwin Kwellicki Waters

Julian Lamar Fugate   

Ben Thomas Shaw enlisted 02/13/1943, into the Army as a Private, ststioned at Camp Blanding, FL: Coast Artillery Corps - Army Mine Planter Service  #34543487

Buck Shaw & Ben Shaw CSWaters-Mixon

At the farm house, 1943

Camp Blanding

Brochure describing the Victory Farm Volunteers program, a subsidiary program of the U.S. Crop Corps. The brochure called on American boys and girls to work on farms to help support the effort to produce the necessary amount of food for the war effort. Victory Farm Volunteers were paid wages, although they were responsible for their own living expenses unless they were covered by the farmer for whom they were working.

Knit For Brit: World War II

Eva Shaw & Conye Shaw made sweaters for the war effort. Americans had already been knitting and preparing care packages of food and clothes called “Bundles for Britain” to help besieged Londoners.

Life Magazine 1941

Watch the video: 14 Αυγούστου 2005: Η τραγωδία της Ήλιος. AlphaNews Live. AlphaNews